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16.1 Introduction 
Introduction of the euro on January 1, 2002 has implications far beyond the present 
borders of the European Union.  A crucial aspect of Central and Eastern European Countries’ 
(CEECs’) transition from planned to market economies is their transition toward new 
exchange rate regimes. At issue is first, whether and when certain CEECs will officially 
euroize, that is adopt the euro de jure as their sole legal tender. Official euroization could be 
bilateral, by joining the European Monetary Union (EMU). Alternatively it could be 
unilateral, without joining EMU and without explicit prior sanction by the authorities in 
Brussels and Frankfurt who control EMU membership.
1 An important element in 
determining this choice is the extent to which these countries are already unofficially 
euroized or dollarized. Unofficial (de facto) euroization or dollarization results from 
individuals and firms voluntarily choosing to use foreign currency as either a transaction 
substitute (currency substitution) or a store of value substitute (asset substitution) for the 
monetary services of domestic currency.  
Advocates of dollarization or euroization suggest that adopting a strong foreign 
currency enables countries to eliminate the temptation of inflationary finance and thereby 
avoid currency and balance of payment crises, reduce the level and volatility of interest rates, 
and ultimately stimulate growth. Opponents cite loss of seigniorage and loss of an 
independent monetary policy.  3
Often overlooked in this normative debate are positive issues surrounding the extent 
to which these countries are already de facto euroized or dollarized. The major limitation of 
any analysis of unofficial foreign currency use is that the amount of foreign cash in 
circulation (FCC) is typically unknown.  There is virtually no reliable empirical information 
concerning the actual extent of dollarization or euroization in transition countries.  
Asset and currency substitution is induced by past inflations, devaluations, and 
currency confiscations. When de facto dollarization or euroization is widespread, the 
effective money supply is much larger than the domestic money supply and is, moreover, less 
easily controlled by the monetary authority because of the public’s propensity to substitute 
foreign for domestic currency. For example, de facto use of FCC will thwart government 
efforts to employ inflationary finance to impose implicit taxes on domestic monetary assets.  
Extensive currency substitution not only makes domestic monetary policy less effective, it 
also makes active exchange rate intervention more dangerous. 
Currency substitution also has fiscal consequences that are particularly salient for 
transition countries. Foreign cash transactions reduce the costs of tax evasion and facilitate 
participation in the “underground” economy. This weakens the government’s ability to 
command real resources from the private sector and deepens fiscal deficits. The shifting of 
economic activity toward the unreported economy distorts macroeconomic information 
systems (Feige, 1990, 1997), thereby adding to the difficulty of formulating macroeconomic 
policy. By obscuring financial transactions, currency substitution reduces the cost of 
enterprise theft and facilitates corruption and rent seeking. 
There is now a growing body of evidence (Feige 1994, 1997; Porter and Judson 1996) 
suggesting that 40-60 percent of US cash is held abroad. The “official” estimate now 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 A similar discussion is underway in several Latin American countries about possible adoption of the 
U.S. dollar as official currency: indeed, Ecuador, El Salvador and Guatemala have all recently done 
so.   4
published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Federal Reserve Board is based on an 
adjusted version of the proxy measure proposed by Feige (1994). The official estimate 
suggests that in 2001, 50 percent of the $580 billion of US currency in circulation was held 
abroad. Studies by Seitz (1995) and Doyle (2000) find that 35-70 percent of D-Marks (DM) 
was held outside of Germany. In this paper we present newly collected data on the location 
of US dollars abroad as well as the location of certain former European national currencies 
held in transition countries. These data enable us finally to circumvent the problem of 
“unobservability” that has plagued the currency substitution literature since its inception, 
permitting a refinement of definitions and measures of currency substitution, asset 
substitution and unofficial foreign currency use.  
Once unofficial foreign currency use is measurable, it becomes possible to examine 
its causes, as well as the circumstances under which it is likely to become persistent, if not 
irreversible.
2  Oomes (2001) and Feige et al. (2002a, 2000b) find that hysteresis and 
irreversibility are induced by network externalities associated with the use of foreign 
currency. When network externalities become sufficiently large, countries may decide to 
dollarize or euroize their economies, forgoing the flexibility of domestic monetary 
management in exchange for greater financial stability and an enhanced ability to attract 
foreign investment.  
In Section 16.2 we briefly review earlier IMF efforts to measure dollarization by 
employing foreign currency deposits (FCD) as a proxy for the degree of dollarization. We 
then define several new measures of dollarization, currency substitution and asset 
substitution that take explicit account of newly available information on holdings of U.S. 
cash in various transition countries. In principle, currency substitution occurs when a foreign 
                                                 
 
2 For an elaboration of the irreversibility problem see Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992) and Balino, 
Benett and Borensztein (1999).   5
currency substitutes as a medium of exchange for the domestic currency, whereas asset 
substitution refers to the holding of foreign rather than domestic money as a store of value. In 
practice, we will define currency substitution in terms of U.S. dollar cash holdings, and asset 
substitution in terms of U.S.-dollar-denominated bank deposits. 
In Section 16.3 we present estimates of per capita holdings of U.S. dollars in various 
transition countries, and also review several indirect means of estimating FCC that have been 
employed in Croatia (Feige et al., 2002a).  We also present new survey estimates by the 
Austrian National Bank (ONB) of both the amount and composition of FCC holdings in 
several CEECs. FCC estimates are then employed to obtain new dollarization indices. In 
Section 16.4 we compare these new indices to earlier proxy measures of dollarization 
employed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We find that IMF dollarization 
measures are highly correlated with our measure of asset substitution but appear to be 
imprecise measures of currency substitution. Section 16.5 employs, inter alia, our estimates 
of unofficial foreign currency holdings to analyze the likelihood that various CEECs will 
choose to euroize officially, and if so whether they are likely to do so bilaterally or 
unilaterally. 
16.2 Definitions
3 
In an economy with unofficial dollarization, the effective broad money supply (EBM) 
consists of local cash in circulation outside the banking system (LCC), foreign cash in 
circulation outside the banking system (FCC), local checkable deposits (LCD), foreign 
currency deposits (FCD) held with domestic banks, and local currency time and savings 
deposits (LTD). Quasi money (QM) consists of FCD and LTD. The typical definition of 
broad money (BM) falls short of the EBM by the unknown amount of FCC. The narrow 
                                                 
 
3 This conceptual framework is adopted from Feige et al. (2002a).  6
money supply (NM) is typically defined to include only LCC and LCD. However in a 
dollarized economy, the effective narrow money supply (ENM) also includes FCC. 
4 Thus: 
 
(1)  EBM ≡  LCC + FCC + LCD + QM ≡  BM + FCC, where: 
(2)  QM ≡  FCD + LTD 
(3)  BM ≡  LCC + LCD + QM 
(4)  NM ≡  LCC + LCD 
(5)  ENM ≡  NM + FCC  
 
In a regime with de facto dollarization, the recorded money supply falls short of the 
effective money supply due to the omission FCC, which is typically unknown and not 
directly controllable by the local central bank. Due to lack of data on foreign currency in 
circulation (FCC), research on the currency substitution process has been forced to accept the 
observable amount of foreign currency deposits (FCD) as a proxy for dollarization. Studies 
of currency substitution, often associated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
employ the ratio of FCD to broad money to establish the extent to which countries are 
dollarized.
5 We denote this common dollarization index: 
(6)  (DIIMF) ≡  FCD/BM. 
 
De facto dollarization is often a response to hyperinflation or a history of bank 
confiscations. Under such circumstances, a foreign currency may first serve as a unit of 
account and store of value and only later as a circulating medium of exchange. Currency 
substitution suggests that the foreign currency largely displaces the domestic currency as the 
medium of exchange. When a foreign nation’s currency has substituted for local currency 
primarily as the medium of exchange, it is useful to define an explicit currency substitution 
                                                 
 
4 We ignore those rare institutional circumstances in which transfers between foreign currency 
deposits are employed for transaction purposes. 
 
5 Balino et al. (1999) choose to define highly dollarized countries as those whose ratio of FCD/broad 
money exceeds 30 percent. The major shortcoming of this definition is that it takes no account of 
foreign cash in circulation. Further study is required to determine whether there exists a unique 
threshold value of the dollarization index at which dollarization is likely to become irreversible 
because of network externalities.   7
index (CSI), which shows the fraction of a nation’s total currency supply held in the form of 
foreign currency.
6 Thus,  
(7)  CSI ≡  FCC/(FCC+LCC) 
Since domestic transactions are typically settled by debiting and crediting local checkable 
deposit (LCD) accounts, it may also be useful to modify the CSI and use instead, (CSIn) 
defined as the fraction of the effective narrow money supply made up of foreign currency. 
(8)  CSIn ≡  FCC/(ENM). 
When dollarization primarily involves the use of foreign denominated monetary assets as 
substitutes for domestic ones in their capacity as stores of value, it is useful to define an asset 
substitution index (ASI) as the ratio of foreign denominated monetary assets to domestic 
denominated monetary assets excluding cash outside banks
7: 
(9)  ASI ≡  FCD/(LCD+QM). 
When both asset substitution and currency substitution take place, or when FCD’s are 
used by firms to make transactions with international partners, we define a broader unofficial 
dollarization index (UDI) that represents the fraction of a nation’s broad effective money 
supply composed of foreign monetary assets. Thus: 
(10) UDI ≡  (FCC+FCD)/EBM.  
Each of the foregoing indices depends upon a number of incentives to hold the different 
assets described in the denominator and numerator. These incentives include relative rates of 
return as reflected in interest rate differentials, inflation differentials, and exchange rate 
                                                 
 
6 In some countries foreign banknotes may simply be hoarded and treated purely as a store of value. 
When this part of FCC can be estimated, it should be treated as a store of value and included in the 
asset substitution index. 
 
7 The quality of ASI as a definition of asset substitution also depends upon the particular institutions 
of a nation. Its quality is high when the amount of FCD and LTD used for transactions purposes is 
low in comparison to the amount of those deposits used as income earning assets. 
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depreciation, as well as the relative benefits and costs associated with network externalities 
and switching costs.  
The conventional IMF dollarization index (DIIMF) will be an adequate proxy of de facto 
dollarization when foreign currency holdings are of marginal importance, or when FCC and 
FCD are highly complementary. If, however, significant amounts of foreign currency 
circulate for transaction purposes, or if FCC and FCD are in fact substitutes, the IMF 
dollarization measure is likely to perform poorly as an indicator of de facto dollarization. 
Typically, the IMF dollarization index will understate the true extent of dollarization due to 
its omission of FCC holdings. Moreover, DIIMF does not permit one to distinguish between 
the dynamic currency substitution and asset substitution processes that our more refined 
indicators attempt to capture. In order to examine the adequacy of the IMF index, we turn 
first to a discussion of our efforts to obtain direct estimates of US currency holdings in 
transition countries. 
16.3 Measurement 
16.3.1 Direct measurement of FCC 
Empirical studies suggest that roughly 50 percent of US currency circulates abroad. 
US currency (cash) has many desirable properties. It has a reputation as a stable currency, 
and is therefore a reliable store of value. It is available in many countries, is widely accepted 
as a medium of exchange, and protects foreign users against the threat of bank failures, 
devaluation and inflation. Cash usage preserves anonymity because it leaves no paper trail of 
the transaction for which it serves as the means of payment. Indeed the very characteristics 
that make the US dollar a popular medium of exchange also makes it difficult to determine 
the exact amount and location of US notes circulating abroad. Nevertheless, there is a direct 
source of information that can be used to determine the approximate amounts of US cash in 
circulation in different countries.  9
Over the past two decades, the United States Customs Service has been mandated to 
collect systematic information on cross border flows of US currency. The Currency and 
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (also known as the "Bank Secrecy Act") requires persons 
or institutions importing or exporting currency or other monetary instruments in amounts 
exceeding $10,000 to file a Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary 
Instruments (CMIR).
8  The information contained in the millions of confidential individual 
CMIR forms has been aggregated in order fully to preserve the confidentiality of individual 
filers’ information. The aggregated data yield time series observations on the gross inflows 
and outflows of US currency to different destinations. By cumulating the CMIR recorded net 
outflows of US dollars to each destination, we are able to obtain estimates of the amount of 
US currency held abroad as well as the location of US currency in various transition 
countries. The 1999 CMIR estimates of per capita FCC holdings in US dollars in various 
transition countries are presented in Column (1) of Table 16.1. 
A second source of data on per capita holdings of US currency is obtained from 
informal interviews and surveys [US Treasury Department (2000)] conducted by Federal 
Reserve and Treasury officials. These estimates are presented in Column 2 of Table 16.1. 
Although the CMIR estimates and informal interview estimates for some countries are quite 
different, both sources confirm the belief that per capita holdings of US currency are highest 
in Russia, Latvia, Turkey and Bulgaria. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 See Feige (1996; 1997) for greater detail concerning CMIR data.  10
TABLE 16.1 
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF PER CAPITA FCC HOLDINGS IN VARIOUS 
TRANSITION COUNTRIES. 1997-2001. 
 
  
(1)* (2)**  (3)  (4)  (5)***  (6)*** 
Country 
Per  
Capita 
$FCC 
Per 
Capita 
$FCC 
Per 
Capita 
$FCC 
Per 
Capita 
$FCC
Per 
Capita 
$FCC 
Per 
Capita 
$FCC 
  
CMIR 
Estimates 
(1999) 
Treasury 
Informal 
Survey 
ONB 
Survey 
ONB   
Survey 
Blowup 
Denomination 
Displacement 
Money 
Demand
          
 
Dollars 
Only 
Dollars 
Only 
All     
Currencies 
All 
Currencies
All 
Currencies 
All 
Currencies 
          
Armenia  10.6 NA             
Azerbaijan  21.1 NA             
Belarus  0.8 288             
Bulgaria  63.1 120             
Croatia  NA NA  166  831  273  1386 
Czech 
Republic  NA NA  220  1098       
Estonia  34.7  NA             
Hungary  2.2 NA  29  145       
Kazakhstan  288  NA             
Kyrgyzstan  7.1  NA             
Latvia  432  208             
Lithuania  24  139             
Poland  90  26             
Romania  10.3  52             
Russia  448  407             
Slovak 
Republic  NA NA  148  742       
Slovenia  NA NA  246  1231       
Turkey  74.7 157             
Ukraine  23.9 NA             
 
* Author’s calculations; ** United States Treasury Department (2000); *** Feige (2002a) 
 
There is considerable anecdotal evidence that many of the CEECs employed national 
currencies of European nations, in addition to dollars, as co-circulating currencies. 
Unfortunately CMIR type data are not available for European currencies. Residents of several  11
transition countries are however known to hold various amounts of DM and other European 
currencies such as the Austrian schilling (AST) and the Swiss Franc (SF).  In anticipation of 
the euro conversion, the Austrian National Bank (ONB) commissioned Gallup to conduct a 
series of surveys in five CEECs in order to determine the extent of FCC holdings of various 
non-local currencies.  Each of the ten surveys conducted between June 1997 and November 
2001 involved approximately 1000 persons above the age of 14.
9 Column (3) of Table 16.1 
presents the average estimate of total per capita FCC holdings expressed in terms of US 
dollars over the period 1997-2001.  
Survey results concerning self-admitted currency holdings are best considered as 
lower bound estimates of actual currency holdings since such surveys are known to suffer 
from underreporting bias. For example, Federal Reserve Survey of Currency Usage reveals 
that US households admit to holding less than 10 percent of the nation’s total currency supply 
in circulation outside of banks. Official estimates of US dollar holdings abroad suggest that 
roughly 50 percent of US currency is presently held overseas.  Since firms hold a negligible 
amount of cash, it appears that the Federal Reserve currency survey results require a blow-up 
factor of five in order to obtain a true estimate of actual domestic currency holdings.  
Assuming that the ONB survey estimates are subject to the same types of 
underreporting bias observed in similar Federal Reserve studies, we present in Column (4) of 
Table 16.1, upper-bound ONB estimates employing the same blow up factor required for the 
Federal Reserve survey estimates. 
10 
                                                 
 
9 We are indebted to the Austrian National Bank (ONB) for providing us with the underlying survey 
data that permitted computation of the estimates presented in the accompanying tables and figures. 
 
10 One important contribution of the ONB surveys is that they provide insight not only into the total 
amount of FCC held in the five survey countries, but also into the currency composition of these FCC 
holdings. In each of the five countries, the DM is the largest component of FCC holdings, followed by 
the US dollar. The consensus estimate of DM held outside of Germany is roughly the equivalent of 
$50 billion.  Using the ONB survey blowup estimates of total DM held in the five countries implies 
that these countries collectively account for roughly 23 percent of the DM believed held outside of  12
16.3.2 Indirect Measures of FCC 
16.3.2.1 Denomination Displacement Method 
Feige et al. (2002a) developed indirect methods for estimating the amount of 
unobservable FCC in Croatia. The first of these, known as the denomination displacement 
method, derives from the observation that in dollarized countries using US currency as a 
means of exchange, most transactions are effected with the largest denomination bills 
available: that is, with $100 U.S. bills.  Similarly, it is suspected that in Croatia, the bulk of 
transactions involving co-circulating currency are carried out with larger denomination 
foreign currency notes, particularly 500 and 1000 DM bills. The denomination displacement 
method is based on the hypothesis that countries that are heavily dollarized, with large 
denomination foreign bills, will have domestic currency (LCC) denomination structures that 
are unusually skewed away from the higher denomination domestic bills.  Denomination 
displacement occurs as higher denomination FCC bills substitute for high denomination LCC 
bills. It is however recognized that as network externalities lead to the more pervasive use of 
foreign currency, lower denominations may also be employed for various transactions. It is 
therefore appropriate to view this indirect method as yielding a lower bound estimate. 
In order to employ the denomination displacement method to estimate FCC holdings 
in Croatia, Feige et al. (2002a) employed Currency and Monetary Instrument Reports to 
obtain estimates of FCC in both highly and only partially dollarized countries.  The 
denomination structure of local currency was then examined in order to determine the extent 
to which denomination displacement took place.  The denomination structure of the Croatian 
kuna was then compared to the denomination structures of currencies from other transition 
countries. By examining the denomination structures for currencies in both dollarized and 
non-dollarized countries, Feige et al. (2002a) were able to estimate the extent of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Germany.  The Czech Republic appears to hold almost 10 percent of estimated DM abroad, followed  13
denomination displacement in dollarized regimes. The dollarization displacement was 
estimated by regression analysis and the displacement parameters were then applied to 
Croatia in order to obtain and estimate of the amount of FCC in circulation. The resulting 
estimates are presented in column (5) of Table 16.1. 
16.3.2.2 Money Demand Method 
The second indirect approach to estimating the unknown amount of FCC in 
circulation in Croatia was to investigate the demand for money in a highly dollarized country 
for which data were available on the actual amount of currency substitution that had taken 
place. Argentina was chosen as the country whose dollarization process could be directly 
modeled.  Since the Argentina hyperinflation experience and subsequent stabilization 
program was similar in many respects to that of Croatia, Feige et al. (2002a) estimated an 
empirical demand function for FCC in Argentina that depended upon independent variables 
that are readily measured in Croatia. The parameters derived from the estimated FCC demand 
function for Argentina were then used to simulate the unobserved demand for FCC in 
Croatia. The resulting estimates of FCC holdings in Croatia are reported in column (6) of 
Table 16.1. The table reveals that the blown up ONB survey estimate of FCC holdings in 
Croatia falls within the range bounded by the two indirect methods of estimation. 
16.4 Comparison of Alternative Dollarization Indices. 
16.4.1 Overall Dollarization Indices 
Given the estimates of FCC holdings displayed in Table 16.1 it is now possible to 
examine the consequences of employing the new unofficial dollarization index UDI as 
compared to the conventional IMF dollarization index (DIIMF).  Feige et al. (2002a) examined 
these ratios for a sample of 24 countries for which data were available and found that the 
                                                                                                                                                        
by Croatia with 6 percent.  14
widely used IMF dollarization index is highly correlated with the asset substitution index but 
is an imprecise measure of currency substitution. 
 
FIGURE 16.1 COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE DOLLARIZATION INDICIES-
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Figure 16.1 displays a country-by-country comparison of the conventional IMF 
dollarization proxy (DIIMF) as well as our broader unofficial dollarization index (UDI) that 
takes explicit account of the estimated amount of FCC in circulation in each nation in 1999.
11 
By definition, the IMF dollarization index understates the true extent of unofficial 
dollarization due to its omission of FCC. The corrected UDI index reveals that of the 
                                                 
 
11 The calculations for both indices employ the average values of FCC obtained by the various 
methods in each of the transition countries. 
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transition countries in our sample, Croatia and Russia exhibit the highest degree of de facto 
dollarization, that is, the highest fraction of the effective broad money supply in the form of 
foreign-denominated assets. Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Turkey, and the 
Ukraine score above 40 percent in the de facto dollarization ranking.  
16.4.2 Currency Substitution and Asset Substitution Indices 
Feige et al. (2002a) examined the relationship between the (DIIMF) index of unofficial 
dollarization and found that the widely used IMF dollarization index is highly correlated with 
the asset substitution index but appears to be an imprecise measure of currency substitution. 
Figure 16.2 therefore presents the more refined CSI and ASI indices that respectively 
measure the degrees of currency and asset substitution for each of the transition countries in 
1999.
12  
The figure reveals that the fraction of the total currency supply made up of foreign 
cash (CSI) exceeds 75 percent for Russia, Kazakhstan, Croatia and Belarus.  These are 
countries in which the extensive use of foreign currency has likely surpassed the threshold 
level making it highly unlikely that it can be reversed. These are also countries that earn 
relatively little seigniorage from their own currencies since FCC has largely displaced them.  
Conversely, Poland, Estonia and Hungary are nations whose total currency supply consists of 
more than 80 percent local currency. These countries would bear highest seigniorage costs by 
unilaterally euroizing; bilateral adoption of the euro, by contrast, would be compensated by 
seigniorage sharing with the rest of the EMU. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 These indices are based on the average estimated FCC holdings over all methods of estimation.   16
 
FIGURE 16.2 MEASURES OF CURRENCY AND ASSET SUBSTITUTION -1999 
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Figure 16.2 also reveals that patterns of currency substitution and asset substitution 
are in fact quite different among the countries observed. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan exhibit a 
pattern in which asset substitution dominates currency substitution by a wide margin. The 
converse is true for Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania, Russia, and Turkey. 
The reasons for these differences may be quite complex, but the data indicate that asset 
substitution and currency substitution need not go hand in hand. 
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16.5 The Future 
What can we infer from our data and indicators on 19 transition economies about the 
direction of dollarization and euroization in CEECs in future: say over the next five to ten 
years? Of course the data themselves carry limited information, but in the context of probable 
accession to the European Union, and accounting for so-called “network externalities”, they 
are certainly suggestive. 
Politically, it is likely that five of the countries on our list – a group that was “first 
tier” until this ranking system was replaced by an informal queue after the November 1999 
Helsinki summit -- will join the EU on or about January 2005. At least another five – the 
original “second tier” group -- is likely to join before, say, 2010. Once these countries join 
the EU, they will be expected – indeed, required – to adopt the euro officially and bilaterally 
as soon as they meet the five “Maastricht” criteria for accession to European Monetary Union 
(EMU). Of the remaining nine countries on our list, two or three may also join the EU within 
the next decade, and will then be expected to euroize officially. Finally, the remaining seven 
or eight countries are likely to become increasingly dollarized or euroized de facto, and some 
may be tempted to withdraw their domestic currencies from circulation altogether and adopt 
foreign currency exclusively and unilaterally.  
Now consider network externalities. Feige et al. (2002b), derive plausible conditions 
under which dollarization becomes “irreversible”, essentially because the benefit/cost ratio 
attached to the external currency rises rapidly with the number of users relative to users of the 
domestic currency. The same logic would suggest that euroization might become irreversible 
as an increasing number of contiguous and nearby countries euroize. In other words, the 
network externality logic suggests that even in those CEECs not presently in the queue for 
accession to the EU – countries like Croatia – the potential benefits from unilateral 
euroization are likely to rise rapidly in the near future.   18
Most of our data is on dollar holdings, not DMs or euros. It is misleading to 
extrapolate the latter from the former, since ratios of dollar to non-dollar foreign currency 
holdings vary widely from country to country. Nevertheless it seems realistic to infer that the 
marginal costs of shifting from one foreign currency into another (i.e. from dollars into euros) 
are substantially lower than the marginal costs of shifting from foreign to domestic 
currencies. Hence countries that have partially dollarized are more likely to move toward 
euros than back to local currencies. In addition, we can infer that the relative benefits 
attached to euros as opposed to dollars – at least for transactions purposes – will rise as 
contiguous and nearby countries euroize.  These two inferences together – both of them 
consistent with network externality models --suggest that as official euroization spreads 
eastward, the incentive will rise for CEECs to move unilaterally from unofficial, partial 
dollarization or euroization to official, exclusive euroization. 
The network externality logic can be elaborated by considering certain conventional 
measures of criteria for optimal currency areas (OCAs). Most of these criteria are not strictly 
separable from network effects: for example, the extent to which a country trades with so-
called “Euroland” interacts with and enhances network benefits from using the euro 
domestically, as does the extent to which labor and capital are mobile to and from Euroland.  
A final factor that is likely to influence a CEEC’s decision to euroize unilaterally is 
the Maastricht criteria. Two of these criteria in particular are likely to prove problematic for 
countries in early stages of transition: the inflation criterion, and the exchange rate criterion. 
The former requires a country aspiring to adopt the euro officially to run an average inflation 
rate of no more than 1.5 percentage points above the best three “member states”: i.e., 
countries already in EMU. The latter requires that its nominal exchange rate remain within 
“normal fluctuation margins” (plus or minus 15 percent) for at least two years prior to 
adoption of the euro.  19
The potential problem with meeting these criteria results from the likelihood that 
productivity growth in the tradeables sectors of CEECs will increase faster than in the EU. It 
then follows from the Balassa-Samuelson condition that the real exchange rate (in terms of 
euros per unit of CEEC currency) will rise.
13 Now of course the real exchange rate can rise in 
one, or a combination, of two ways: the domestic price level can rise relative to EU levels, or 
the nominal exchange rate can rise. The upshot is that the first is likely to violate the EMU’s 
inflation criterion, and the second is likely to violate its exchange rate stability criterion.  
Countries aspiring to join the EMU are likely to be put through a wringer of sorts in 
order to meet the inflation criterion. With prices of non-tradeables rising faster than in the 
EU, they may be forced to impose a recession, and/or limit wage increases in controllable 
sectors like government, education and health. This in turn would increase incentives for 
labor to emigrate to Western Europe, and exacerbate tensions between CEECs and the EU. 
An easier out would be to allow nominal exchange rate appreciation (which would lower 
inflation in tradeables), but large short-term exchange rate changes are similarly proscribed 
by the Maastricht conditions. Substantial nominal exchange rate appreciation would also 
obviate the post-accession inflationary pressure that could come from joining the EMU at an 
under-valued rate, as happened with the Irish punt after March 1998. 
However, countries not aspiring to EMU in the near future – in practice, countries 
currently ineligible to join the EU -- might well be tempted to euroize unilaterally, so as to 
sidestep the Masstricht criteria. More precisely, in the post-euro era, the likelihood that non-
accession CEEC countries will unilateral euroize depends on three factors: the extent to 
which they are already euroized or dollarized; the extent to which they meet OCA criteria, 
particularly those that involve trade, capital and labor flows with the EMU countries; and 
                                                 
  20
finally the length of time they are likely to have to wait before they become eligible for 
accession to the EU. In the next section we ask what light our new dollarization data can cast 
on the first of these three factors.  
16.5.1 Partial dollarization as an incentive for full euroization 
Consider first what we will call Group A: the five countries likely to enter the EU by 
2005: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Figure 16.2, reveals that the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia have CSIs of 65 or more: that is, at least 65 percent of their 
total currency supply is held in the form of foreign currency. Poland has 20 percent, with 
Hungary and Estonia at less than 15 percent. However, the ONB surveys suggest that 
Hungary has long been a heavy user of the DM and the Austrian Schilling. What we will call 
Group B consists of Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and the Slovak Republic. Three of 
the five have CSIs of 54 or more; Romania is also high, at 43, and Lithuania is at 30 percent. 
Now consider Group C, the remaining countries on our list: Belarus, Croatia, Kazakhstan, 
Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine. The first five of these nine 
countries have CSIs ranging from 68 to 86, with the other four between 31 and 40. Moreover 
in all cases the ASI is 35 or above.  
Overall, the CSI average for Group A is 36 percent, for Group B 49 percent and for 
Group C 60 percent.  What this admittedly casual comparison suggests is that the degree of 
currency substitution increases as the country’s remoteness from EU membership increases. 
While it may be that some Group A and B countries’ CSI indices would exceed Group C’s if 
all DM holdings were included, these figures nevertheless suggest that at least five Group C 
countries may already be irreversibly addicted to foreign currency. Indeed, a network 
externality analysis of Argentina (Feige et al., 2002b) suggests that countries with more than 
                                                                                                                                                        
13 More precisely, this result follows from a higher excess productivity growth differential between 
traded and non-traded goods sectors in CEECs than in the EU. In recent years a lively literature has 
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60 percent of their currency in the form of external currency are likely to be irreversibly 
dollarized.  
Moreover the high ASI scores of Group C countries reinforce their incentives to lock 
into external currency, since the costs of continuing with local currency rise with asset 
substitution.  Dean (2001) discusses three phenomena, all related to asset and liability 
substitution, that add to a country’s incentives to exclusively adopt foreign currency. The 
three phenomena are liability dollarization, risk premia on interest rates, and exchange rate 
impotence. They are related to asset substitution in the sense that lenders, including domestic 
lenders, would much rather hold dollar claims than local currency claims; hence developing 
and transition country borrowers must either issue dollar-denominated liabilities (in fact that 
is in practice their only option for external borrowing), or pay currency-risk premia on local-
currency liabilities. Moreover, even dollar liabilities carry a default risk premium that derives 
from the risk of currency depreciation and consequent increase in the local-currency debt 
burden. The upshot is that countries are afraid to permit exchange rate depreciation: hence the 
exchange rate’s “impotence” as a policy tool.  
In short, most of the non-EU-accession CEECs on our list (Group C) are: a) more 
highly currency- (i.e. cash-) dollarized than most EU-accession countries; and b) more highly 
bank-deposit-dollarized as well. We infer from this that a) for network externality reasons the 
use of foreign currency (be it in dollars or euros) for transactions purpose is unlikely to be 
reversible in these countries, even if they pursue moderate macroeconomic policies and 
hence reduce inflation risk, and b) for currency and default risk reasons the net benefits from 
full dollarization or euroization are likely to be high. Such benefits rise in proportion to their 
foreign-currency-denominated asset holdings and debt liabilities. 
According to CSI criteria, the Group C countries where foreign currency use is least 
likely to be reversible (with CSIs above 60 percent) are Belarus, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Russia  22
and Turkey.    According to ASI criteria, those that would benefit most from full dollarization 
or euroization are Armenia, Croatia, and Kyrgysztan. Moreover, Kazakhstan probably has an 
ASI over 50, but data are unavailable.  
If some of these countries do withdraw their domestic currencies, are they likely to 
dollarize, or will they euroize? Here once again we distinguish between the network benefits 
that are related to currency substitution, and the liability dangers that are related to asset 
substitution.  The latter, we would argue, are likely to be decisive. Belarus and Russia, each 
with manageable foreign currency debt, are likely to choose to live without the additional 
transactions benefits that could come from full dollarization. In addition, much of their 
extraordinarily high cash relative to bank deposit holding derives from asset rather than 
transactions motives: their relative reluctance to hold dollars as bank deposits reflects both 
distrust of banks, and a desire to avoid taxes. In any case, nationalism and hubris will prevail 
against full dollarization in Russia for the foreseeable future.  
Croatia, Kazakhstan and Turkey are different: there, network externality motives are 
much more likely to prevail. In Croatia and Turkey this will be reinforced by their strong 
trade (and tourism) links to Western Europe; the euro, not the dollar, is likely to be the 
foreign currency of choice. Kazakhstan may be different because of its oil industry, which 
dominates both external trade and much internal commerce.  
Ukraine is a case in point. The dollar is not commonly used (in fact is technically 
illegal) for transactions purposes, although most foreign firms, aid agencies and non-
government organizations pay their employees in dollars, which are then converted into 
domestic currency for transactions. Moreover Ukraine’s dollarized debt is relatively small 
and it runs a fiscal surplus; therefore putative currency depreciation does not jeopardize either 
the private or public sectors. (In fact, the Ukrainian Hryvnia has recently begun to appreciate, 
a la Balassa-Samuelson.) Finally, inflation has been well under control for the past six years.   23
In fact introduction of the Hryvnia in 1995 coincided with the end of hyperinflation, which 
has helped to establish the currency as an important icon of Ukraine’s independence. In short, 
Ukrainians do not hold dollars primarily for either transactions purposes or as a hedge against 
inflation or devaluation. And since they still receive considerable FDI from, and trade 
substantially with, Russia (though their investment and trade with Euroland is growing)
14, 
they have less immediate reason on OCA grounds than do CEECs to adopt the euro. 
16.6 Summary and Conclusions 
In an effort to overcome the 'unobservability' problem that has plagued the currency 
substitution literature, we present direct estimates of the amounts of US dollar foreign 
currency in circulation in various transition countries. We also review other evidence on the 
use of European national moneys, particularly the DM, as co-circulating currencies. Finally, 
we present estimates of FCC based on two indirect methods.  
Traditional measures of dollarization largely relied on foreign currency deposits as an 
indicator of currency substitution because actual measures of foreign currency in circulation 
were unavailable. Employing aggregated data derived from Currency and Monetary 
Instrument Reports on dollar inflows and outflows to and from the US, as well as estimates of 
other European currencies that co-circulate with local currencies, we estimate the total 
amounts of FCC in various transition countries. These new estimates permit a refinement of 
definitions and indices of currency and asset substitution, as well as broader indices of the 
extent of de facto dollarization. Traditional measures of dollarization tend to be indicative of 
asset substitution but perform poorly as measures of currency substitution.  
Our measures of currency and asset substitution help us to infer how countries that 
will not qualify for EU or EMU membership in the near future are nevertheless motivated to 
                                                 
 
14 For a recent study of Ukraine’s evolving trade and investment patterns with Western Europe vis a 
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abandon their domestic currencies and adopt the euro unilaterally. Although our CSI and ASI 
indices suggest that the incentives to do so are particularly high in Armenia, Belarus, Croatia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Turkey - that is, all have strong transactions, asset or 
bank-credibility motives for euroization - other considerations make it unlikely that Belarus, 
Russia and Ukraine will do so for the foreseeable future.  
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